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Abstract 
 
I discuss the design and implementation of a SSNIP test in order to identify the relevant market in a 
media market. I argue that in such a two-sided market the traditional SSNIP test cannot be applied 
as it is usually conceived but rather should be modified in order to take into account indirect 
network externalities. I discuss the issues of which price the hypothetical monopolist should be 
thought of as raising, of whether we should look at profits changes on only one side or on both sides 
of the market and of which feedback among the two sides of the market we should take into 
account.  
I then derive the relevant formulas for Critical Loss Analysis. These look much uglier than in a 
single-sided market but in fact they are easy to calculate as they are still expressed in terms of 
elasticities and of current observed markups, prices and quantities. Data requirements are however 
higher as one needs to estimate the matrixes of the own and cross price elasticities of demand on the 
two-sides of the market and the matrixes of the network effects.  
The paper fills a gap in the economic literature, so much more as market definition in media 
markets is at the centre of many recent competition policy and regulation cases around the world. 
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1 – Introduction 
 
In most economic models the relevant market is simply assumed. In practice however it is of great 
importance for any antitrust case. A wrong definition of the relevant market might for instance lead 
the antitrust authority or the courts to blocking a welfare enhancing merger or to allowing a welfare 
detrimental one. Also, in case of appeal, the recognition of a wrong market definition is sufficient 
for the courts to reject the whole analysis and rule in favour of the parties irrespective of any other 
argument brought up by the antitrust authority. Market definition is therefore the founding stone on 
which an antitrust case is built.  
 
The “small significant non-transitory increase in price test” (SSNIP test), also known as 
“hypothetical monopolist test” (HM test),  is a conceptual tool used to define the relevant market. In 
a standard market, starting from a set of candidate products for the relevant market, the SSNIP test 
is implemented by first simulating a price increase by a hypothetical monopolist who owns just one 
product and, as long as that leads to estimated losses in profits, progressively increasing the number 
of products owned by the monopolist. When profits are not estimated to decline following a small 
but significant increase in price by the hypothetical monopolist, the set of products owned by the 
monopolist in the last simulation constitutes the relevant market. 
 
Many recent competition policy cases, such as the merger between Google and DoucleClick, call 
for both theoretical and empirical guidance on the design and implementation of a SSNIP test in 
such two-sided markets2 as the media ones. A correct product market definition is also crucial in 
designing regulation in the media market, in light of the progress in information and communication 
technologies. 
  
I discuss the design and implementation of a SSNIP test in order to identify the relevant market in a 
media market. In such a two-sided market the traditional SSNIP test cannot be applied as it is 
usually conceived. That is because a firm in a two-sided market sells two products or services to 
two distinct group of consumers and recognises that the demand from one type of consumers 
depends on the demand from the other type of consumers and vice versa, but consumers on the two-
sides of the market do not internalise these indirect network effects. Since there is a link between 
demands on the two sides of the market, the profit function of a hypothetical monopolist who raises 
the price in a significant non-transitory way on one-side of the market is linked to the profit in the 
other market and the question arises of which feedbacks between the profits on the two-sides of the 
                                                 
2 See also Argentesi & Ivaldi (2005). 
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market should be considered. Moreover, since in a two-sided market the profits of the hypothetical 
monopolist are determined by both the price level (roughly, the sum of the prices paid by the two 
sides) and the price structure (roughly, the ratio of the prices paid by the two-sides), it is not a priori 
clear whether the hypothetical monopolist should be thought of as raising a) the price level while 
optimally adjusting the price structure b) both prices together keeping fixed the price structure c) 
each of the two prices separately allowing the other price to be adjusted optimally d) each of the 
two prices while keeping the other price fixed. 
 
In the present paper I therefore address these questions. I claim that profits on both sides of the 
market  and all feedbacks should be taken into account and I suggest that in such two-sided markets 
as the media ones the test is run by raising each of the two prices separately allowing each time the 
other price to be adjusted.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant economic literature. Section 3 
discusses the rationale behind the SSNIP test in a single-sided market. Section 4 first proposes a 
SSNIP test for two-sided markets of the “media type” and derives the formulas necessary for the 
analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 – The literature 
 
Following the seminal works by Parker and Van Alstyne (2002),  Rochet & Tirole (2002, 
2003,2006) and Armstrong (2006), a growing number of papers have dealt with theoretical aspects 
of two-sided markets, e.g. Caillaud & Jullien(2003), Anderson & Gabszewicz (2005) and Guthrie & 
Wright(2007). Some of them, such as Evans(2003), Wright(2004) and Evans & Schmalensee 
(2005), have focused on competition policy in two-sided markets. They have pointed out for 
instance that, unlike the price level, due to the presence of indirect network externalities, the 
efficient price structure does not reflect the ratio of marginal costs on the two sides of the market 
and, more generally, that increased competition does not necessarily lead to a more balanced price 
structure nor to a more efficient one. Most policy contributions so far, except Emch & Thomson 
(2006), Evans & Noel (2005a, 2007), Argentesi & Filistrucchi (2007), Rochet & Tirole (2008) and 
Evans (2008), have mainly criticized the application of standard competition policy results to two-
sided markets rather then suggesting alternative ones and, from the practical point of view, they 
argued against existing practice rather than providing new methods to practitioners. 
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More specifically, despite the rich literature on two-sided markets, only a few papers have dealt 
with market definition in two-sided markets, and in no way conclusively. Carlton(2007) simply 
claims that market definition in two-sided markets is more difficult than in the usual single-sided 
markets because of the uncertainty on the choice of the price the hypothetical monopolist should 
raise. Argentesi & Ivaldi (2005) discuss the issue in the context of the media market. Their paper 
however mainly argues for the need to take into account indirect network externalities in order to 
get unbiased estimates of the own and cross price elasticities of demand. They then present 
supporting results from a simple econometric exercise on a dataset of French newspapers in order to 
support their claim. Evans & Noel (2005a) argue for the need to take into account feedbacks 
between the two sides of the markets due to demand externalities and point to the difficulties arising 
in market definition when two-sided platforms compete with standard firms on one side of the 
market. Evans & Noel (2007) propose a way to extend the Critical Loss Analysis, an alternative to 
the SSNIP test,  to two-sided platforms and derive formulas for its implementation. They propose to 
perform CLA by raising each price separately while keeping the other fixed and to take into account 
all feedbacks. They then illustrate the bias due to not taking into account feedbacks between the 
two-sides of the market. Evans (2008) discusses again market definition in two-sided markets, in a 
non technical way. Emch & Thomson (2006) discuss the design of a SSNIP test in the payment 
cards market and propose to apply the SSNIP test to the total price charged by the hypothetical 
monopolist while letting relative prices on the two sides of the market adjust optimally. Their paper 
however does not discuss the case of other markets and the proposed test is not directly applicable 
to most media markets, as I will argue below. 
 
3 –Market Definition in a Two-Sided Market 
 
3.1 – The SSNIP test for one-sided markets 
 
In a potential market with many possible products, assuming an ideal situation where all relevant 
own and cross price elasticities of demand among these products have been estimated, the question 
arises of identifying a threshold on elasticities in order for substitution to be relevant enough to 
include two products in the same market. 
 
The issue is solved applying the “small significant non-transitory increase in price” test (SSNIP 
test), also called the “hypothetical monopolist” test (HM test).  
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The SSNIP test or the HM test as a method for defining markets was first introduced in 1982 in the 
U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines. In the EU it was used for the first time in the 
Nestlé/Perrier case in 1992 and has been officially recognised by the European Commission in its 
Commission's Notice for the Definition of the Relevant Market in 1997. There are however some 
differences in the way it is carried out by practitioners in the US and in the EU and more generally 
under different jurisdictions around the world3.  
 
In a standard market, the SSNIP test is, according to the EU merger guidelines, implemented by 
first simulating a given price increase above the current competitive level by an hypothetical 
monopolist which owns just one product and, as long as that leads to estimated losses in profits, 
progressively increasing the number of products owned by the monopolist. When profits are not 
estimated to decline following a small but significant increase in price by the hypothetical 
monopolist, the set of products owned by the monopolist in the last simulation constitutes the 
relevant market. According to the US guidelines, it is instead implemented by first simulating the 
optimal price increase above the current competitive level by a profit maximizing hypothetical 
monopolist and, as long as that is at least a small but significant non transitory increase, 
progressively raising the number of products owned by the monopolist. When the profit 
maximizing hypothetical monopolist will not raise prices by at least a small but significant non 
transitory increase, the set of products owned by the monopolist in the last simulation constitutes 
the relevant market.  
 
Note that, although at first sight it might not seem so, there is indeed a difference between the test in 
the US and the test in the EU.  
 
Both in the US and in the EU, there is also not unanimous consensus as to whether on all but the 
first step, one should raise just the price of the first product taken into consideration or should raise 
the prices of all products owned by the hypothetical monopolist at that step in the procedure. 
 
In any case the basic idea behind the SSNIP test is that substitution among two products is enough 
to include them in the same market if an hypothetical monopolist would find it unprofitable to raise 
the price of one product in a small significant non-transitory way (EU merger guidelines) or if an 
hypothetical monopolist would find it profit maximizing to raise current competitive prices in a 
                                                 
3 See Werden 2003 for a history of the Hypothetical Monopolist test and an explanation of the differences in the way it 
is implemented.   
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small significant non transitory way (US merger guidelines)4. In either case, in practice, the small 
significant change in price is usually 5% in the EU or 5-10% in the US and non-transitory is usually 
considered to mean 1 year.5 
 
Using such a hypothetical monopolist as a benchmark reminds of issues concerning market power. 
This can however be misleading. The assessment of market power or the prediction of merger 
effects should be conducted after the relevant market has been defined.  
 
Yet one of the rationales behind using a hypothetical monopolist as a benchmark that, by defining a 
market as the minimum set of products for which a small but significant increase in price by the 
hypothetical monopolist above the current (competitive) level is not unprofitable (EU version), or 
on which an hypothetical monopolist would maximise profits by increasing price in  at least a small 
but significant way above the current (competitive) level (US version), one makes sure that the 
market is the smallest one that it is worth monopolising6. That monopolising the market must be 
worthwhile is clearly a requirement of economic theory, although the 5% and 10% values for the 
price increase are of course arbitrary7.  
 
Another rationale for having an hypothetical monopolist is to make sure strategic effects among 
competitors are ruled out when testing for substitution among products. For the same reason the 
prices of all products not owned by the hypothetical monopolist at a given stage of the procedure 
are kept constant.8 
                                                 
4 See Werden  2002b for a rationalization of the different ways the SSNIP test is implemented according to different 
measures of substitutability between products. 
5 There is a well-known problem in the application of the SSNIP test, even to a single-sided market, when it comes to 
choosing the starting price level for the price increase, in that  in the presence of perfect collusion or of monopoly any 
price increase above the current level is likely to be unprofitable, leading to a wider market definition and therefore to a 
finding of no (joint) dominance. It is the so-called “cellophane fallacy” from the Du Pont case in the US in the 1950s, , 
see Motta (2001) and Bishop & Walker (1999). I abstract here from this problem and assume the starting price level is a 
competitive one, though not necessarily the one obtained under  the assumptions of the model of perfect competition. 
6 At the same time however, even absent strategic reactions from rivals, any firm owning a subset of the products in the 
market will not be able to profitably raise prices by 5% or 10%.  
7 One should note that in general choosing a 10% increase in prices implies a larger market definition than a 5% 
increase and therefore both a lower chance to find market power and abuses and a lower chance to identify concerns of 
unilateral effects in mergers. 
8 A debated issue is however whether one should take into account capacity constraints in the production of goods not 
owned by the hypothetical monopolist. I do not address this concern here. 
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 In practice in order to implement the test assumptions are needed on the demand functions and the 
cost function. The most common assumptions are those of  linear or constant elasticity demands and 
linear costs.  
 
This is true also of Critical Loss Analysis (CLA) and Critical Elasticity Analysis (CEA), the usual 
ways a SSNIP test are implemented by practitioners.  
 
Critical Loss Analysis in its EU version proceeds as follows: first, the critical loss in sales of an 
hypothetical monopolist  owning just one product is calculated; this is the maximum loss in sales 
due to a price increase of 5% or 10% which would not make the price increase unprofitable; second, 
the actual loss in sales following a 5% or 10% increase in price is estimated; third, the actual loss in 
sales is compared to the critical loss in sales; if the actual loss in sales is smaller than then critical 
loss in sales, then a small significant price increase would be profitable and the market is defined; 
otherwise, the market is assumed to contain also another product and the analysis is repeated. 
 
Critical Loss Analysis in its US version proceeds as follows: first, the critical loss in sales of an 
hypothetical profit-maximizing monopolist owning just one product is calculated; this is the 
maximum loss in sales the hypothetical monopolist would tolerate and still raise its price by 5% or 
10% ; second, the actual loss in sales following a 5% or 10% increase in price is estimated; third, 
the actual loss in sales is compared to the critical loss in sales; if the actual loss in sales is smaller 
than then critical loss in sales, then a small significant price increase would be profit maximizing 
and the market is defined; otherwise, the market is assumed to contain also another product and the 
analysis is repeated. 
 
Table 1 below reports the formulae that are commonly used to determine the critical loss in Critical 
Loss Analysis: m is the current (competitive) markup, t is the significance threshold for price 
increases t (i.e. usually 0.05 or 0.10).  
 
Table 1: Critical Loss Formulae (constant marginal cost) 
 
 
Demand Curve US EU 
tm
t
2+ tm
t
+  Linear 
tm
t
+tm
t
t +
−−
+−
1
)1(1   Isoelastic 
Table 12: Critical Loss Formula (Werden, 2002)
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The actual loss formula is instead 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Δ
ΔΔ=Δ
q
p
p
q
p
p
q
q  
and if demand is linear or for small changes in p 
q
pp
p
q
q εΔ=Δ . 
 
Critical Elasticity Analysis in its EU version proceeds as follows: first, the critical elasticity faced 
by an hypothetical monopolist owning just one product is calculated; this is the maximum elasticity 
an hypothetical monopolist could face without a given price increase of 5% or 10% becoming 
unprofitable; second, the actual elasticity faced by an hypothetical monopolist is estimated; third, 
the actual elasticity is compared to the critical elasticity; if the elasticity is smaller than the critical 
elasticity, then a small significant price increase would be profitable and the market is defined; 
otherwise, the market is assumed to contain also another product and the analysis is repeated. 
 
Critical Elasticity Analysis in its US version proceeds instead as follows: first, the critical elasticity 
faced by a hypothetical profit-maximizing monopolist owning just one product is calculated; this is 
the elasticity that would lead a profit maximizing hypothetical monopolist to increase prices of 5% 
or 10% ; second, the actual elasticity faced by the hypothetical monopolist is estimated; third, the 
actual elasticity is compared to the critical elasticity: if the actual elasticity is lower than then 
critical one, then a profit-maximising hypothetical monopolist would increase prices more than the 
given threshold and the market is defined; otherwise, the market is assumed to contain also another 
product and the analysis is repeated. 
  
Table 2 below reports the formulae that are commonly used to determine the critical loss in Critical 
Elasticity Analysis.  
 
 
Table 2: Critical Elasticities Formulae (constant marginal cost) 
 
 
Demand US EU 
tm 2
1
+ tm +
1  Linear 
)1log(
)log()log(
t
mtm
+
−+
tm
t
+
+1   Isoelastic 
Source: (Werden, 2002)
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 Therefore, under the simplifying assumptions mentioned above, to check what happens to profits as 
prices rise, one should estimate the elasticities of demands with respect to prices and have a measure 
of the marginal cost (or of the mark-ups), in addition to observing current (competitive) quantities 
sold and prices (or revenues). 
 
The same is not true of a two-sided market where estimation of indirect network effects between 
demands on the two-sides of the market is also necessary, as we will show in Section 4. 
 
4 -  Market Definition in a Two-Sided Markets 
 
 
When discussing the extension of the SSNIP test to a two-sided market, some additional issues arise 
which make the analysis more complex than in the standard case discussed above: 
- given that in a two-sided market there are indirect network externalities, should we take into 
account also (all?) feedbacks from one side of the market to the other? should we look at what 
happens to profits on only one side or on both sides of the market? how do we deal with products 
which are competing on one-side of the market but not on the other-side? 
- given that in a two sided market the hypothetical monopolist sets (at least) two prices, which price 
should he be thought of as raising?  
 
4.1 -  Which price? 
 
In a two-sided market one can distinguish: 
a) the price level (roughly, the sum of the two prices) 
b) the price structure (roughly, the ratio of the two prices) 
 
Should then the hypothetical monopolist be thought of as raising:  
i)  the price level keeping fixed the price structure?  
ii) the price level adjusting optimally the price structure? 
iii) first one of the two prices keeping the other fixed and then the other price keeping the first    
fixed? 
iv) first one of the two prices and then the other price, each time adjusting optimally the price    
structure? 
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Answering questions as the ones above requires first a distinction between two types of media 
market: those where the interaction between the two consumer groups is observable (e.g. an internet 
surfer clicks on an ad) and those where the interaction is not observable (e.g. a reader reads an ad or 
a reader is influenced by an ad). The presence of the interaction allows the two-sided media 
platform to charge one of the two sides (i.e. the advertisers) a per-interaction fee, possibly in 
addition to a subscription fee (i.e. in fact a two-part tariff) such as in the model of Rochet & Tirole 
(2006), while its absence only allows the platform to charge a subscription fee as in the model of 
Armstrong (2006). Clearly the presence of such an interaction is crucial for the practical 
implementation of the test in as much as such an interaction and the prices charged for it to the two-
sides are observed.  
 
Note however that in all media markets there is no real transaction between end-users, in the sense 
as there is for instance in a payment card market, as readers/viewers/listeners are not interested in 
seeing an ad, or their interest is only secondary with respect to that for content (news, films, music) 
provided by the platform.  
 
Moreover, in most media markets the interaction is not observable. I will therefore mainly 
concentrate on this latter situation.  
 
Figure 1 
A Two-Sided Market: Media
Media Firm
reader/
viewer/
listener
advertiser
Newspapers, TV, Radio, Internet…
ad fees
ad slot
price for content
advertising 
message
media 
content Note: no
per-
transaction 
fees
Note: no
per-
transaction 
fees
 
 
Note also that in a media market in the presence of multi-homing a platform can be in the relevant 
market on one-side but not on the other, e.g. TV might be a substitute for newspapers for an 
advertiser (as he just cares to reach his potential consumers) but not for a reader/viewer (as for 
instance a person can/likes to read his newspaper on the metro on his way to work and can/likes to 
watch TV at home in the evening). Moreover, as discussed in Evans & Noel (2005a), who bring the 
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example of bill-board advertising, in a market of the media type it might well be that a platform is 
competing with a one–sided firm on one of the two sides of the market. The same is not true in a 
payment card market, i.e. a card is either in the relevant market on both sides or not. 
 
Given these different features, although one would ideally want an extension of the SSNIP test to 
two-sided markets which is the same for all types of two-sided markets, I believe the extension 
should be done differently according to the type of two-sided market.  
 
In a market as the media one the hypothetical monopolist should be thought of as raising first one of 
the two prices and then the other price. Only in this way one could still interpret the test in terms of 
the original idea of a benchmark on the degree of substitution between products.  
 
In addition I believe the hypothetical monopolist should be allowed to optimally adjust the price 
structure. First, the benchmark to decide when “substitution is enough” in a single-sided market is 
“what would happen to profits of an hypothetical monopolist” there is no reason why the latter 
should not be the benchmark also in a two-sided market. Second, more importantly, one still makes 
sure that the market is defined as the smallest one that it is worth monopolising (in the sense of 
where it is worth or optimal for a monopolist raising the price by 5% or 10% above the current 
competitive price). Finally, from a practical point of view, allowing the hypothetical monopolist to 
optimally adjust the price structure would have the positive side-effect to mitigate the otherwise 
unjustified worries of antitrust authorities that in a two-sided market with two positive indirect 
demand externalities considering all feedbacks would lead to a very wide market, since allowing the 
hypothetical monopolist to adjust optimally the price structure would, by definition, tend to increase 
the profitability of the price rise. 
 
I therefore agree with Emch & Thomson (2006) in that in a two-sided market as the payment cards 
one the hypothetical monopolist should be thought of as raising the price level, adjusting optimally 
the price structure.  I claim however that their extension of the traditional SSNIP test is not valid in 
a two-sided market of the media one. In such a market, as in Evans & Noel (2005b,2007), the 
hypothetical monopolist should be thought of as raising first the price on one side then that on the 
other side, but differently from Evans & Noel (2005b,2007) he should be allowed to adjust 
optimally the price structure. 
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4.2 -  Which profits and which feedbacks ? 
 
The issues of which feedbacks between the two-sides of the market should be taken into account 
and of whether we should look at what happens to profits on only one side or on both sides of the 
market are crucial. 
 
For a two-sided market of the “media type”, keeping in mind that the SSNIP test should aim at 
establishing whether there is “enough substitution”, similarly, to Evans & Noel (2005b, 2007), I 
believe we should look at what happens to profits changes on all sides of the market and take into 
account all feedbacks (see figures 2 and 3). Many antitrust authorities seem to worry that in a two-
sided market with two positive indirect demand externalities, considering all feedbacks would lead 
to a much wider market definition than single-sided market. This fear is unjustified as the point is 
exactly that the market is two-sided and should be treated as such. One should stress that there 
would be no feedback effect if there were no initial substitution effects in the market where the 
price has been increased (see figures 2 and 3). Moreover, if one allows the hypothetical monopolist 
to optimally adjust the price structure as claimed above, the feared enlargement of the market would 
be smaller, as the optimal adjustment of the price will lower the profit loss from the rise in price. 
 
To this regard, assuming the relevant elasticities have been correctly estimated, in market where 
positive indirect network effects prevail (i.e. where accounting for feedbacks decreases the 
profitability of the rise in prices), it is true that if one applies the formula proposed by Evans&Noel 
(2005a,2007) the market is defined too widely (as it does not allow the hypothetical monopolist to 
optimally adjust the price on the other side), whereas if one applies the usual single-sided formulas, 
the market is defined too narrowly (as feedbacks are not accounted for). This relationship can 
sometimes provide sufficient indications in a competition policy cases9.   
 
With regard to the issue of how to deal with products which are competing on one-side of the 
market but not on the other-side, I believe one should take into account feedbacks from this 
products too in the analysis (see q3B in figures 2 and 3).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 For example, in a market where positive indirect network externalities prevail, if a given merger does not raise 
competitive concerns in a market defined according to the single-sided formula, a fortiori it wouldn’t raise competitive 
concerns in the larger market defined according to the correct two-sided formula.  
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Figure 2 
Market of the “Media Type”:
Feedbacks & Profits
pA1↑ qA1↓
qB1↓
πB↓
Given p2A , p1B ,p2B
πA1?
Market A to be defined
Feedback 
to market A
Feedback 
to market B
Positive externalities
qB2↑
qA1↓
πA↓
qA2↑
qA2↑ …
…
qB3↑
…
Media Market: 
Feedback & Profits - 1
 
 
Figure 3 
pA1↑ qA1↓
qB1↓
πB↓
For given p2A , p1B ,p2B
πA1?
Market A to be defined Feedback 
to market A
Feedback 
to market B
One negative externality
and so on
qB2 ↑
qA1↑
πA ↑
qA2↑
qA2↑ …
…
qB3↑
…
Media Market: 
Feedback & Profits - 2
 
 
Finally, note that Evans & Noel (2007) distinguish between a short-run effect of the price increase, 
when the feedbacks have not taken place yet, and a long-run effect, when the feedback have all 
taken place. In fact, I believe such a distinction is in general useful from a theoretical point of view, 
as for sure there is a time dimension in the feedback story. However, the distinction is probably 
useless from the practical point of view in the case of the SSNIP test, as the price change is by 
definition “non transitory” and, as mentioned above, in a single-sided market “non transitory” is 
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usually taken to be a year.  One could then claim that for most media markets one year is probably 
enough for all, or at least most, of the feedbacks to take place. 
 
4.3 – The SSNIP test in a two-sided market 
 
Taking into account the arguments above, I now proceed to develop the analytical formulas for the 
implementation of the test in a media market. 
 
In a two-sided market with n candidate products j=1,2,…,n for the relevant market on each side 
m=A,B of the market, if the hypothetical firm is a monopolist over production of good 1, its profits 
in an adoption model are: 
 
),(),(),( BAABBBBAAA ddCdpdpdpdp −+=Π        (1) 
 
Then if it is possible to solve explicitly the system10 
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If, in performing the SSNIP test, the hypothetical monopolist is allowed to adjust optimally the 
price of the good on the other side of the market, it will set 
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             (5) 
which identifies a relationship   
 
0),(
*
=BA ppf            (6) 
 
so that, if the equation can be solved explicitly for11, it exists a function 
                                                 
10 In fact, even if the system cannot be solved explicitly, one might be able to find the first derivatives (through the 
implicit function) and therefore to derive the first-order condition. 
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)(
*
AB pgp =             (7) 
which gives the optimal price on side B, . for any price charged on side A, .  Bp* Ap
 
 
EU version 
Therefore, in the EU version of the SSNIP test, in the first step, to check what happens to Π as 
increases, one should check the sign of  Ap
)),()))1((),1(( BAA
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A
A pp
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p
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p
p Π−Δ+Δ+Π=ΔΠ       (8) 
Note that, as for the SSNIP test in a single-sided market, assumptions are needed on the demand 
function and the cost function in order to calculate the first term on the right-hand side, which 
represents the counterfactual profits of the hypothetical monopolist and is therefore not observable 
by definition. One of the most common sets of assumptions are those of linear demand and linear 
cost.12 Under these assumptions13,   ( ) ( )
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11 In fact, even if one cannot write the explicit function, one might be able to find the first derivatives (through the 
implicit function theorem) and therefore to derive 
A
AA
p
pg
∂
∂ )(   
12 Alternative assumptions are those of constant elasticity demand functions and/or constant elasticity cost functions. 
These assumptions, as the linear ones, allow to derive the counterfactual from the observed data.   
13 See Appendix 1a 
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US version 
Instead, in the US version of the SSNIP test, in the first step, one should check whether an 
hypothetical monopolist, choosing  in order to maximize  BA pp 11 ,
),(),,((),(),( BAB
BAABABBBAAA ppqppqCppqpppqp −+=Π    (10) 
would raise the price by more than the given threshold, that is whether Ap1
%10or%5
1
*
>−=Δ A
AA
A
A pp
p
p
         (11) 
where is the profit-maximizing price set by the hypothetical monopolist on side A. Ap*
From the first order conditions 
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Again assumptions are needed on the demand function and the cost function. Under the usual 
assumptions of linear demand and linear costs14 
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             (13) 
All in all, it is therefore clear that in order to perform the SSNIP test, in both the US and the EU 
version, one should not only estimate the own and cross elasticities of demand with respect to price 
and observe prices, sales and per unit costs on both sides of the market but also estimate the cross 
market network externalities. 
 
4.3 – Critical Loss Analysis in a two-sided market 
 
EU version 
Critical Loss Analysis in its EU version in a two-sided market should proceed as follows: first, the 
critical loss(es) in sales on side A (and side B) of an hypothetical monopolist owning just one 
product is calculated; this is the maximum loss in sales due to a price increase of 5% or 10% on side 
A which would not make the price increase unprofitable; second, the actual loss(es) in sales on side 
                                                 
14 See Appendix 1b 
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A (and side B) following a 5% or 10% increase in price on side A is (are) estimated; third, the 
actual loss(es) in sales is (are) compared to the critical loss in sales; if the actual loss(es) in sales is 
(are) smaller than then critical losses in sales, then a small significant price increase on side A 
would be profitable and the market is defined; otherwise, the market is assumed to contain also 
another product and the analysis is repeated. 
 
Mathematically, assuming there n candidate products for the relevant market on side A of the 
market, in the first step, if the hypothetical firm is a monopolist over production of good 1, by 
increasing the price of its product 1 on side A  by ΔpA  and adjusting the price ratio A
B
p
p
Δ
Δ optimally, 
the gains on side A will be  and those on side B will be )( AAA qqp Δ+Δ )( BBAA
B
qqp
p
p Δ+ΔΔ
Δ , while 
the losses will equal AA
A q
q
Cp ΔΔ
Δ−− )(  and BBB qq
Cp ΔΔ
Δ−− )( . 
Equating the gains to the losses gives:  
B
B
BA
A
ABBA
A
B
AAA q
q
Cpq
q
Cpqqp
p
pqqp ΔΔ
Δ−−ΔΔ
Δ−−=Δ+ΔΔ
Δ+Δ+Δ )()()()(    (14) 
This is the break-even condition. Clearly if the gains are higher than the losses (i.e. the left-hand 
side is higher than the right-hand side) then the price increase is profitable; vice versa the price 
increase is unprofitable.  
As in a single-sided market I now proceed to manipulate the break-even condition in order to 
express it in terms of the given percentage price increase A
A
p
pΔ , other observables (such as 
) and of the percentage losses in sales, BABA qqpp ,,, A
A
q
qΔ  and B
B
q
qΔ  the latter then being the 
critical losses, i.e. those that would guarantee a break-even following a given price increase. 
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After this manipulation15 and assuming both linear demands and linear costs, the formula that 
defines implicitly the Critical Losses A
A
q
qΔ and  B
B
q
qΔ on the two-sides of  a two-sided market 
according to the EU version of the SSNIP test:  
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where AR  are revenues from side A, A
A
A
p
pt Δ= is the percentage price increase on side A deemed 
relevant (5% or 10% usually) and A
A
A
A
A
p
q
Cp
m
)( δ
δ−
= is the observed mark-up on side A . And 
similarly for side B. 
 
Note that the part  
( ) BBBBAAAAAAA RqqmqqmtRRt ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ++  
 is the same as in Evans and Noel (2005a, 2007), while the rest is due to the hypothetical 
monopolist optimally adjusting the price structure.  
 
 
The Actual Losses are instead: 
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If demands are linear, one obtains 
                                                 
15 See Appendix 2a 
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Note however once again that B
B
p
pΔ is not exogenous as in Evans&Noel (2005a, 2007) but is  
endogenously set by the hypothetical monopolist as a best reply to the exogenous change A
A
p
pΔ . 
Manipulating again the first order condition for profit maximization by the hypothetical monopolist, 
one can obtain 16 B
B
p
pΔ as a function of A
A
p
pΔ : 
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So that substituting the latter into (17), the actual losses become17: 
A
B
A
BB
B
A
BB
B
A
BA
BB
B
A
BA
A
q
P
Bq
Pq
p
q
PB
A
q
p
q
pAq
PB
A
q
p
q
pq
PA
A
A
AAL
m
R
Rm
R
R
p
p
q
q εεεεε
εεε
εε −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−Δ=Δ 12
2
1
2
1
2
1
 
 
B
B
B
BB
B
B
BB
B
A
BB
BB
B
A
BB
A
q
p
Bq
pq
p
q
pB
A
q
p
q
pAq
pB
A
q
p
q
pq
PA
A
B
BAL
m
R
Rm
R
R
p
p
q
q εεεεε
εεε
εε −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−Δ=Δ 12
2
1
2
1
2
1
   (19) 
 
If, once the actual losses in (19) are substituted inside the break-even formula (15), the left-hand 
side is positive, then the price increase is profitable; vice versa the price increase is unprofitable.  
Alternatively, one can solve the break-even condition (15) for the Critical Loss A
ACL
q
qΔ and 
substitute on the right-hand side the expression for B
BAL
q
qΔ . One then obtains18: 
                                                 
16 See Appendix 2b. 
17 For the critical loss on side A 
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and similarly for the critical loss on side B. 
18 See Appendix 2c 
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             (20) 
Then, as in the usual single-sided case, one only needs to check the actual loss A
AAL
q
qΔ defined in 
(19) against the critical loss A
ACL
q
qΔ defined above in (20).    
Note that both the Actual Loss formula (19) and the Critical Loss formula (20) look much more 
complex than in a single-sided market but in fact they are still expressed in terms of current 
elasticities and of current observed mark-ups, prices and quantities and rely on the same 
assumptions on demand and costs used to derive the formulas in a single-sided market .  
 
 
US version 
  
Critical Loss Analysis in its US version in a two-sided market should proceed as follows: first, the 
critical loss in sales on side A of an hypothetical monopolist owning just one product is calculated; 
this the maximum percentages of sales that a profit maximizing hypothetical monopolist would be 
willing to loose in order to increase price on side A of  5% or 10%; second, the actual loss in sales 
on side A following a 5% or 10% increase in price is estimated; third, the actual loss in sales is 
compared to the critical loss in sales; if the actual losses in sales is smaller than then critical loss in 
sales, then a small significant price increase would be profit maximizing and the market is defined; 
otherwise, the market is assumed to contain also another product and the analysis is repeated. 
 
From the first order conditions for the hypothetical monopolist’s profit maximization already 
reported in (12), one can obtain the equation for the optimal change in prices on one side A as a 
function of the optimal change in price on side B and of the optimal losses in sales on side A 
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then, substituting inside (21) the expression for  B
B
p
pΔ  in (18), one obtains the expression for the 
Critical Loss on side A 
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Then, as in the usual single-sided case, one only needs to check the actual loss A
AAL
q
qΔ obtained in 
(19) against the critical loss A
ACL
q
qΔ defined above in (22). 
 
Note again that both the Actual Loss and the Critical Loss formulas look much more complex than 
in a single-sided market. This is due to the necessity to take into account the two-sidedness of the 
market. But in fact the formulas are still expressed in terms of current elasticities and of current 
observed mark-ups, prices and quantities and rely on the same assumptions on demand and costs 
used to derive the formulas in a single-sided market .  
 
Yet, looking at the formulas, it is evident that data requirements for the implementation of the 
SSNIP test in two-sided markets, in both its US and EU versions, are higher than in a single –sided 
market as one needs to estimate not only the matrixes of the price elasticities of demand on each 
side of the market but also the matrixes of the  price elasticities across sides of the market. 
 
5 – Conclusions 
 
 
I discussed the design and implementation of a SSNIP test for market definition in two-sided 
markets. I argued that in such a market the traditional SSNIP test cannot be applied as it is usually 
conceived. I proposed a SSNIP test for two-sided markets of the “media type”.  
 
The rationale behind the SSNIP test in a single-sided market is the following: it allows to set an 
(implicit) benchmark for the elasticities to be high enough for two candidate products to belong to 
the same relevant market; the benchmark is set in such a way that the market is defined as the 
smallest set of products on which a monopoly would find it profitable (or profit maximizing) to 
 21
exercise market power by raising non temporarily the price above the current (competitive) level (at 
least) by a small but significant percentage 
 
In order to ensure the same rationale, the SSNIP test in a two-sided market should take into account 
changes in profits on both sides of the market and all feedbacks between profits on the two sides of 
the market following the hypothetical monopolist raise in prices. In addition it should be 
implemented by raising first the price on one side of the market then the price on the other side of 
the market, each time allowing the hypothetical monopolist to optimally adjust the price structure.  
 
The antitrust authorities’ worry that in a two-sided market with two positive indirect demand 
externalities, such a test would lead to a much wider market definition than single-sided market, is 
unjustified as the point is exactly that the market is two-sided market and should be treated as such. 
Yet, assuming a correct estimation of the relevant elasticities, in market where positive indirect 
network effects prevail, it is true that if one applies the formula proposed by Evans&Noel 
(2005a,2007) the market is defined too widely, whereas if one applies the usual single-sided 
formulas, the market is defined too narrowly. This relationship can sometimes provide sufficient 
indications in practice on the relevant market19.   
 
Finally I developed the corresponding formulas for critical loss analysis both for the EU and the US 
version of the test. These look much uglier than in a single-sided market but in fact they are easy to 
calculate as they are still expressed in terms of elasticities and of current observed markups, prices 
and quantities.  
 
Data requirements for the implementation of the SSNIP test in two-sided markets are however 
higher than in a single –sided market as one needs to estimate not only the matrixes of the own and 
cross price elasticities of demand on the two-sides of the market but also the matrixes of the 
network effects.  
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or equivalently 
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             (9) 
1b) In the US 
From the first order conditions for profit maximization by the hypothetical monopolist 
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one can obtain 
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since and  AAA qqq Δ+=* BBB qqq Δ+=*
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∂
∂=−**  
multiplying and dividing the third term on the right-hand side in the first equation by and in the 
second equation by  
ApΔ
BpΔ
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Δ , because demands are linear 
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bringing to the left-hand side all terms with  in the first equation and  Ap*
all terms with in the second equation Bp*
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dividing both sides in both equations by 2 
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since and  AAA ppp +Δ=* BBB ppp +Δ=*
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bringing and on the right-hand side Ap bp
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dividing both sides in the first equation by and both sides in the second by  Ap bp
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then multiplying and dividing the first two terms on the right-hand side in the first equation by  
 and in the second equation by  Ap Aq bq Bp Aq bq
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further multiplying and dividing the first two terms on the right-hand side in the first equation by  
 and in the second equation by  Bp Ap
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and substituting for the elasticities 
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substituting for revenues 
A
A
A
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
q
p
A
A
A
q
p
q
p
A
B
B
B
q
p
q
p
A
B
B
B
B
A
A
p
q
Cp
R
R
p
p
R
R
p
q
Cp
p
p
εε
ε
ε
ε 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 −
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−
−Δ+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−
−=Δ  
B
B
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
B
A
A
A
q
p
q
p
B
A
A
A
A
B
B
p
q
Cp
R
R
p
p
R
R
p
q
Cp
p
p
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
A
B
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−
−−Δ+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−
−=Δ
2
11
2
1
2
1
2
1
εε
ε
ε
ε
 
and, since costs are linear, one can also substitute also for mark-ups 
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then substituting the second into the first one 
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Appendix 2 – Critical Loss Formula in the EU 
 
a) Critical Losses 
 
From the break-even condition 
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where [I] and [III] are the same as in Evans and Noel (2005a, 2007), while [II] is due to the 
hypothetical monopolist optimally adjusting the price structure.  
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If costs are linear [I] becomes 
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If also demands are linear [III] is equal to 
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where is the observed market price on side B  while is the optimal price the hypothetical 
monopolist would have set in correspondence with the observed price  and is the change in 
the hypothetical monopolist’s optimal price following the change in . 
Bp Bp*
Ap
Ap
BpΔ*
Bp*
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If demands and costs are linear, the best reply function is also linear and equal 
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then multiplying and dividing by A
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q  , one finds 
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which is the expression for [IIa].      
In order to obtain [IIb], note first that price BP* is the profit-maximizing one the hypothetical 
monopolist would have set in correspondence to the observed price AP .  
Then, from the first order condition with respect to BP  for the hypothetical monopolist’s profit 
maximization:  
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Then, multiplying and dividing by  all the terms on the right-hand side, by  and the first 
term and by third term only, one gets 
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one obtains the expression for [IIb] 
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Finally, summing up the four parts ][][][][ IIbIIaIII +++  of the equation gives the formula that 
defines implicitly the Critical Loss A
A
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qΔ  in a two-sided market according to the EU version of the 
SSNIP test:  
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Again the first three terms are the same as in Evans & Noel (2005b,2007). 
2b) Optimal price change on side B following a given price change on side A 
From the first-order condition for profit maximization by the hypothetical monopolist in (12) one 
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From the break-even condition (15)  
    
2c) Critical Loss on side A 
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ−−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+
B
B
BB
B
B
B
q
p
B
B
q
p
q
pAA
B
B
AA
A
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
pB
B
B
BAA
A
A
AAA
q
qRm
q
qR
q
qRm
q
qRt
R
RR
q
qmRt
q
qmtR
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
1111
1
2
εε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
 
then 
 40
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
++
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ++⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+Δ+−+−=
Δ Aq
B
B
AAA
BB
B
B
AAA
B
q
p
B
B
q
p
q
p
AA
A
B
B
AAA
AA
A
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
B
B
AAA
BB
AA
A
A
q
q
mtR
Rm
q
q
mtR
R
q
q
mt
m
q
q
mtR
Rt
R
R
q
q
mtR
Rm
mt
t
q
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
1111
1
2
εε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
 
so that 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+++⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+Δ+++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
++
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ++⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+Δ+−+−=
Δq
B
B
AAA
BB
B
B
B
B
AAA
B
q
p
B
B
q
p
q
p
AA
A
B
B
AAA
AA
A
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
B
B
AAA
BB
AA
A
A
A
q
q
mtR
Rm
q
q
q
q
mtR
R
q
q
mt
m
q
q
mtR
Rt
R
R
q
q
mtR
Rm
mt
t
q
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
12111
1
2
εε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
 
or 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+++
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ
++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ
++++
+Δ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
++⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
++
+Δ+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+Δ+−+−=
Δ
B
B
AAA
BB
B
B
AAA
B
q
p
B
B
AAA
B
q
p
AAA
B
q
p
B
B
q
p
q
p
AAA
AA
q
p
q
p
AA
A
B
B
AA
A
A
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
AA
AA
A
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
B
B
AAA
BB
AA
A
A
A
q
q
mtR
Rm
q
q
mtR
R
q
q
mtR
R
mtR
R
q
q
mtR
Rm
mt
m
q
q
mt
t
R
R
mt
Rt
R
R
q
q
mtR
Rm
mt
t
q
q
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
1
1211
2
εεε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
 
which is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
1
21
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ
++
+Δ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ
++
+Δ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
++
Δ
+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+Δ+−
+++++⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+++⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++−=
Δ
B
B
AAA
B
q
p
B
B
AAA
BB
B
B
AAA
B
q
p
B
B
q
p
q
p
AA
A
B
B
AA
A
A
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
B
B
AAA
BB
AAA
BB
AAA
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
AA
A
AA
A
A
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
AA
A
A
A
q
q
mtR
R
q
q
mtR
Rm
q
q
mtR
R
q
q
mt
m
q
q
mt
t
R
R
q
q
mtR
Rm
mtR
Rm
mtR
R
mt
m
mt
t
R
R
mt
t
q
q
B
B
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
εε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
 
or 
 41
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
1
21
1+⎥
⎤⎢⎡+⎢
⎡
⎟⎟
⎞
⎜
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ
++
+Δ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ
++
Δ
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
++
Δ
+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+Δ+−
++++⎥⎦⎢⎣++⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎣ ⎠
⎜
⎝⎠⎝+
B
B
AAA
B
q
p
B
B
AAA
BB
B
B
AAA
B
q
p
B
B
q
p
q
p
AA
A
B
B
AA
A
A
B
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
B
B
AAA
BB
AAA
BB
A
B
pp
AA
B
pp
q
q
mtR
R
q
q
mtR
Rm
q
q
mtR
R
q
q
mt
m
q
q
mt
t
R
R
q
q
mtR
Rm
mtR
Rm
mtRmtmt
t
Rmtq
B
B
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
A
B
BB
A
B
B
B
A
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
εεεε
 
e Critical Loss
⎛
+⎟⎟
⎞
⎜⎜
⎛
+−=Δ AAqq
q
p
AA
A
A
A
q
q
p
q
q
p
AA
A
A
A RmRtq
BB
B
B
A
B
B εεε
 42
so that one obtains th  Aq
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Appendix 3 –The Critical Loss Formula in the US 
a) Critical Loss on Side A 
 
A hypothetical monopolist that wants to maximise profits will set prices to satisfy:  
0),(),(),(),(),(),(),(
1
111
1
11
1
111
1
11
1
111
1
1
111
1111
1
=∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂+∂
∂+=∂
Π∂
B
BAB
B
BA
B
BAA
A
BA
A
BAB
B
A
BAA
ABAA
A p
ppq
q
qqC
p
ppq
q
qqC
p
ppqp
p
ppqpppq
p
0),(),(),(),(),(),(),(
1
111
1
11
1
111
1
11
1
111
1
1
111
1111
1
=∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂+∂
∂+=∂
Π∂
B
BAB
B
BA
B
BAA
A
BA
B
BAA
A
B
BAB
BBAB
B p
ppq
q
qqC
p
ppq
q
qqC
p
ppqp
p
ppqpppq
p
 
             (12) 
From these first order condition for the hypothetical monopolist’s profit maximization, one obtains:  
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then, multiplying and dividing by  all the terms on the right-hand side, by  and the first 
term and by third term only, one gets 
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and substituting for the elasticities  
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then grouping the second and third term  
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subtracting from both sides Bp
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then both multiplying and dividing the first term on the right-hand side by  Ap
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then 
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Similarly 
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And, substituting in the latter, the expression (18)  for B
B
p
pΔ derived in Appendix 2b, one obtains 
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so that 
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and bringing all terms in A
A
p
pΔ on the right-hand side 
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then bringing the term in A
A
q
qΔ on the left-hand side 
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